在会计信息日益混浊的资本市场中，注册会计师无疑在对会计信息的澄清中扮演着重要角色。而审计收费作为联结上市公司与注册会计师的经济纽带则被赋予了更加丰富的内涵。上市公司进行财务舞弊与否，注册会计师与上市公司进行串通舞弊与否直接影响着审计收费，反过来，审计收费的高低亦是上市公司进行财务舞弊抉择、注册会师进行串通舞弊选择需考虑的至关重要因素之所在。进而在政府监管机制不甚健全、法律法规不很完善、职业道德缺失、财务舞弊案件不断浮出“冰山”水面的大背景下，围绕着上市公司财务舞弊展开对审计收费的实证研究显得十分必要，可以为治理财务舞弊提供一条新的思路。基于这种认识，本人选择了这个题目。
本文的创新主要体现在三方面。其一在于将博弈论工具应用于上市公司财务舞弊的研究，比较系统、全面地构建了财务舞弊的博弈理论研究框架；其二在于设计了一个严格认定串通舞弊的标准，并对舞弊公司与串通舞弊公司进行了分类；其三在于基于“财务舞弊”的视角分别检验了舞弊因素与串通舞弊因素对审计收费的影响，为治理财务舞弊提供了一个新的思路。同时，本文也存在着局限性，体现在构建的上市公司与注册会计师动态博弈模型与串通舞弊因素对审计收费的影响的单步回归存在着不一致性。
本文的研究思路是围绕财务舞弊博弈理论框架下的审计收费的实证研究而展开的。论文从构建财务舞弊博弈理论框架入手，逐一构建了上市公司与政府监管机构完全信息静态博弈模型、上市公司与注册会计师的不完全信息动态博弈模型，并进行了求解，进而奠定了研究舞弊公司审计收费的理论基础；然后将财务舞弊公司与非财务舞弊公司进行了配对研究，在控制一些变量的基础上实证检验了舞弊因素对审计收费的影响；紧接着以舞弊公司为研究的载体，考察了串通舞弊因素对审计收费的影响；最后针对本文的研究结论，提出了政策性建议。
本文共分为五部分。第一部分为导论，介绍了论文的研究动机、研究视角、研究目标、本文结构、研究方法与创新、研究所用到的理论，并对国内外已有文献进行了梳理。
第二部分构建了上市公司与政府监管机构的在完全信息下的静态博弈模型，分析出了上市公司与监管机构博弈的纳什均衡；构建了上市公司与注册会计师在不完全信息下的动态博弈模型，并在相关假设的前提下求出了上市公司与注册会计师导致串通舞弊的精炼贝叶斯均衡。从而构建了财务舞弊博弈理论的分析框架。
在完成了理论框架的构建的基础上，对注册会计师审计收费问题进行了实证检验。第三部分采用中国上市公司的数据对财务舞弊上市公司与非财务舞弊上市公司进行了配对研究，借鉴目前比较流行的Simunic的审计费用实证研究模型建立了本论文的模型，着重检验了“是否舞弊（IfFra）”因素对审计收费的显著性。研究发现：进行财务舞弊的上市公司支付的审计收费明显高于非财务舞弊上市公司支付的审计收费，支持了本文的假设1。
第四部分着重检验了“是否串通舞弊（IfClud）”对审计收费的显著性，研究发现：进行串通舞弊的上市公司并没有支付与其它舞弊公司更高的审计收费，这与本文的假设2并不相符，本文从会计师事务所的规模角度进行了解释。
第五部分总结了研究结论，同时提出了本文的政策性建议，包括：（1）完善对上市公司舞弊的监管体制，加大监管力度、增加监管次数与树立建立注册会计师声誉评级机制和奖励机制相结合的“双管齐下”治理思路；（2）进一步规范审计收费的披露制度，加强明细项目的披露；（3）加强软文化建设，培养上市公司的诚信文化与增强注册会计师的职业道德并重。
关键词：审计收费，财务舞弊，串通舞弊，博弈论
ABSTRACT
In the capital market of the growing accounting information distortion, CPA (Certified Public Accountant) without doubt plays a important role to clarify the accounting information. As a economic tie connecting listed companies with CPA, audit fee has been given more abundant connotation. It has great impact on audit fee that whether or not listed companies commit financial fraud and listed companies and CPA commit collusive fraud. On the other hand, the quantity of audit fee is a important factor that is considered by listed companies of financial fraud and CPA of collusive fraud. Therefore, with the environment of regulatory mechanism of Government being imperfect, law being imperfect, the lack of professional ethics, the cases of financial fraud being growingly exposed to the surface of iceberg, it is necessary to research empirically audit fee revolving around the listed companies of financial fraud. The research can provide us a new way to govern financial fraud. I choose this current topic based on this point.
The Creative opinions of the dissertation consist of three aspects. Firstly, applying game theory to research financial fraud, it establishes the game theory framework of financial fraud systematically and comprehensively. Secondly, designing a criterion to define collusive fraud strictly, it classifies financial fraud companies and collusive fraud companies by some criterion. Thirdly, from financial fraud perspective, it testes the significance of IfFra and IfClud for audit fee and provides a new way to govern the financial fraud. At the same time, it lies some limitation. There is inconsistency between dynamic game model of listed companies and CPA and the one-step return of IfClud for audit fee.
The dissertation focuses on the empirical research of audit fee of the game theory framework of financial fraud, and takes it as the core clue of researches. Firstly, it establishes systematically and comprehensively static game model of listed companies and supervision institution of government, dynamic game model of listed companies and CPA from the perspective of game theory. They form the game theory framework of financial limitation fraud, getting Nash Equilibrium Solution and giving the theoretical supports of the dissertation. Secondly, it matches the listed companies of financial fraud with the listed companies based on controlling some variables. It testes the significance of IfFra for audit fee.Thirdly, It testes the significance of IfClud for audit fee with the sample of financial fraud companies. Lastly, it presents some policy proposals based on the conclusion of the dissertation.
It consists of five parts. The first part introduces the reasons of this dissertation, research perspective, research objective, structure, research method, theories used in the dissertation, neatening domestic and overseas literature.
The second part establishes static game model of listed companies and supervision institution of government for complete information and gets the Nash equilibrium. It also establishes dynamic game model of listed companies and CPA for incomplete information and get the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the two models consist the game theory framework of financial fraud.
The third part matches the listed companies with the listed companies of financial fraud and analyzes empirically audit fee of them by use of the data of Chinese listed companies. It forms audit fee measurement model based on the Simunic model and tests the significance of IfFra for audit fee. It comes to a conclusion that the audit fee paid by listed companies of financial fraud is much more than listed companies does．.
The fourth part tests the significance of IfClud for audit fee. It comes to a conclusion that the audit fee paid out by listed companies of collusive fraud is much less than listed companies of financial fraud. It explains the conclusion from the perspective of scale of accounting firms.
The fifth part summarizes the main conclusions of the dissertation and presents some policy proposals. The conclusions consist of three aspects. Firstly, we should improve the supervision authority of financial fraud, enhancing degree of supervision, increasing times of supervision, building up the govern way of establishing the mechanism of prestige rating and reward of CPA. Secondly, we should further perfect the disclosure system of audit fee and strengthen disclosure the detailed item of audit fee. Thirdly, we should foster the soft cultural, cultivating honest culture of listed companies and professional ethics of CPA.
Key words: Audit Fee, Financial Fraud, Collusive Fraud, Game Theory
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