信息在公司治理体系中占有重要地位，各项具体公司治理机制须在充分、及时信息的基础上，才能有效地发挥作用。公司治理要解决的是各利益相关主体的利益协调问题，其中最重要的是作为委托方的投资者和代理人的行为目标一致和利益协调问题。信息，尤其是会计信息，在上述利益协调机制中发挥着基础性作用。
当前公司治理体系中会计作用的发挥主要通过财务会计信息披露来完成，本文从幅度和频率两个维度对财务会计信息披露的公司治理相应进行了研究。从信息披露幅度角度看，作为财务会计信息披露重要内容的年度财务报告信息披露在当前仍属强制性披露，它反映了公司治理各主体的基本信息需求。在这一背景下，信息披露幅度越大，证券市场信息不对称程度越轻；同时，信息披露幅度越大，公司治理各主体需要越长的时间来吸收其中的“新信息”，但和信息披露幅度较小的公司相比，信息披露幅度大的公司从长期来看越能降低信息不对称程度。从信息披露频率的角度看，本文发现季度报告会计准则颁布前后市场的信息不对称水平并没有得到有效的降低，但非定期报告的披露从统计上发现可以引致积极的公司治理效应。
但是，财务会计信息披露虽然能降低证券市场的信息不对称水平，但鉴于其“滞后性”的特征，只能为公司治理主体提供“结果性”的信息，从而降低了会计信息在公司治理体系中作用的范围和效果。管理会计信息，从理论上可以为公司治理体系提供“过程性”的信息，从而及时甚至实时地优化其经济决策行为，这一论题得到了实证数据的支持。本文针对财务会计的“天生不足”，采用问卷调查的研究方法，对投资者的管理会计信息需求进行了专项研究。结果表明，管理会计可以提供“过程性”和“规制性”的公司信息，规避了财务会计信息之后和非会计信息缺乏规制的不足，从而为管理会计在公司治理体系制作用的有效发挥提供了需求方的实证支持。
全文结论为公司治理主体有效利用信息、优化公司治理效应提供了理论支持，并为证券监管证券的制定提供借鉴。
关键词：信息 会计信息 公司治理 财务会计信息 管理会计信息
Abstract
Information performs an important role in corporate governance system and the effective function of all the governance mechanisms must be based on abundant information collected in time. One objective in the governance of a company is to harmonize the relationship among different interest groups and the problem of the first importance here is how to reach the agreement in terms of their objectives and interests between investors as the entrusting party and agents. Information, particularly accounting information, plays a fundamental role in the interest coordination mechanism mentioned above.
In present corporate governance system, accounting exercises its duty through the disclosure of financial accounting information. This paper discusses the scope and frequency of financial accounting information functioning in corporate governance. As for the scope of information disclosure, annual report, which discloses financial accounting information of great importance, is still a kind of mandatory report at present and it reflects the basic demand for information of different governance groups in a company. In this background, broad-scope of accounting information disclosure can decrease the information asymmetry in stock market. Meanwhile, due to the broad scope of financial disclosure, the different governance groups in a company need more time to digest the new information in accounting reports and compare with those companies with narrow-scope information disclosure, and companies with broad-scope information disclosure, in the long run, can effectively reduce information asymmetry. From the perspective of frequency, this paper finds that the asymmetry of market information is not reduced statistically after the accounting standard of quarterly accounting reports is implemented, but it is found statistically that nonsked reports will help to increase entrusting party’s understanding of company operation effectively.
Although the disclosure of financial accounting information can reduce the information asymmetry on the stock market, due to its hysteresis, it can only provide consequential information of company’s operation and thus impairs its effect and function in the administration system of company. Managerial accounting, theoretically, can provide the proceeding information for the corporate governance system and therefore optimize the economic decision action in time or even realtimely, and it is supported by the model regression results. Aimed at the defect in financial accounting system, this paper adopted the questionnaire to investigate investors’ demand for managerial accounting information. The result of the research demonstrates that managerial accounting can provide proceeding and regulating information and avoid the hysteresis of financial information, the deficiency of non-accounting information and the defect of regulation. In short, this paper provides empirical support to prove the effective function of management accounting in corporate governance system.
This paper’s conclusion is to help governance groups utilize information effectively, provides theoretical support for the optimized governance of company and works as reference for supervision of stock market.
Key words: information, accounting information, corporate governance, financial accounting information, managerial accounting information
查看更多内容请登录“资料库”->“论文资料库”
